From ca08f801cf71a258a204c40dcb71db17465293b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: HackTricks News Bot <bot@hacktricks.xyz>
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 19:30:35 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Add content from: Node.js Trust Falls: Dangerous Module
 Resolution on Windows

---
 .../README.md                                 | 70 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md
index 878b781024a..84ab0f9ead1 100644
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md
+++ b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md
@@ -887,6 +887,72 @@ For more information about how to abuse this check:
 dll-hijacking/writable-sys-path-dll-hijacking-privesc.md
 {{#endref}}
 
+## Node.js / Electron module resolution hijacking via `C:\node_modules`
+
+This is a **Windows uncontrolled search path** variant that affects **Node.js** and **Electron** applications when they perform a bare import such as `require("foo")` and the expected module is **missing**.
+
+Node resolves packages by walking up the directory tree and checking `node_modules` folders on each parent. On Windows, that walk can reach the drive root, so an application launched from `C:\Users\Administrator\project\app.js` may end up probing:
+
+1. `C:\Users\Administrator\project\node_modules\foo`
+2. `C:\Users\Administrator\node_modules\foo`
+3. `C:\Users\node_modules\foo`
+4. `C:\node_modules\foo`
+
+If a **low-privileged user** can create `C:\node_modules`, they can plant a malicious `foo.js` (or package folder) and wait for a **higher-privileged Node/Electron process** to resolve the missing dependency. The payload executes in the security context of the victim process, so this becomes **LPE** whenever the target runs as an administrator, from an elevated scheduled task/service wrapper, or from an auto-started privileged desktop app.
+
+This is especially common when:
+
+- a dependency is declared in `optionalDependencies`
+- a third-party library wraps `require("foo")` in `try/catch` and continues on failure
+- a package was removed from production builds, omitted during packaging, or failed to install
+- the vulnerable `require()` lives deep inside the dependency tree instead of in the main application code
+
+### Hunting vulnerable targets
+
+Use **Procmon** to prove the resolution path:
+
+- Filter by `Process Name` = target executable (`node.exe`, the Electron app EXE, or the wrapper process)
+- Filter by `Path` `contains` `node_modules`
+- Focus on `NAME NOT FOUND` and the final successful open under `C:\node_modules`
+
+Useful code-review patterns in unpacked `.asar` files or application sources:
+
+```bash
+rg -n 'require\\("[^./]' .
+rg -n "require\\('[^./]" .
+rg -n 'optionalDependencies' .
+rg -n 'try[[:space:]]*\\{[[:space:][:print:]]*require\\(' .
+```
+
+### Exploitation
+
+1. Identify the **missing package name** from Procmon or source review.
+2. Create the root lookup directory if it does not already exist:
+
+```powershell
+mkdir C:\node_modules
+```
+
+3. Drop a module with the exact expected name:
+
+```javascript
+// C:\node_modules\foo.js
+require("child_process").exec("calc.exe")
+module.exports = {}
+```
+
+4. Trigger the victim application. If the application attempts `require("foo")` and the legitimate module is absent, Node may load `C:\node_modules\foo.js`.
+
+Real-world examples of missing optional modules that fit this pattern include `bluebird` and `utf-8-validate`, but the **technique** is the reusable part: find any **missing bare import** that a privileged Windows Node/Electron process will resolve.
+
+### Detection and hardening ideas
+
+- Alert when a user creates `C:\node_modules` or writes new `.js` files/packages there.
+- Hunt for high-integrity processes reading from `C:\node_modules\*`.
+- Package all runtime dependencies in production and audit `optionalDependencies` usage.
+- Review third-party code for silent `try { require("...") } catch {}` patterns.
+- Disable optional probes when the library supports it (for example, some `ws` deployments can avoid the legacy `utf-8-validate` probe with `WS_NO_UTF_8_VALIDATE=1`).
+
 ## Network
 
 ### Shares
@@ -2022,5 +2088,9 @@ C:\Windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe -version #Compile the
 - [A Link to the Past. Abusing Symbolic Links on Windows](https://infocon.org/cons/SyScan/SyScan%202015%20Singapore/SyScan%202015%20Singapore%20presentations/SyScan15%20James%20Forshaw%20-%20A%20Link%20to%20the%20Past.pdf)
 - [RIP RegPwn – MDSec](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2026/03/rip-regpwn/)
 - [RegPwn BOF (Cobalt Strike BOF port)](https://github.com/Flangvik/RegPwnBOF)
+- [ZDI - Node.js Trust Falls: Dangerous Module Resolution on Windows](https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2026/4/8/nodejs-trust-falls-dangerous-module-resolution-on-windows)
+- [Node.js modules: loading from `node_modules` folders](https://nodejs.org/api/modules.html#loading-from-node_modules-folders)
+- [npm package.json: `optionalDependencies`](https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/configuring-npm/package-json#optionaldependencies)
+- [Process Monitor (Procmon)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procmon)
 
 {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}