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Capability handles are the better model. The LLM should not need to know the shape of issued states with sensitive keys. |
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Pre-submission Checklist
Your Idea
Currently, the only way for an MCP server to issue a dynamically generated secret to an AI agent is to store it in the LLM's context. Anything in context can be leaked though. Instructing "DO NOT LEAK THE VALUE RETURNED BY THIS TOOL CALL" does not guarantee the value could not be leaked through prompt injection.
Is there a proposal or existing standard/tool that would allow MCP servers to provide secrets outside of context? E.g.:
The MCP client intercepts the secret value and surfaces a placeholder key to the LLM. Then the LLM would reference
secrets.create_edit_session.SESSION_SECRET_0to be interpolated in future MCP request payloads:This capability would allow MCP servers to issue arbitrary secrets to the AI agent without ever leaking the secret to users or other MCP servers. Only the harness would hold the secret and substitute the secret into payloads for future MCP requests.
Scope
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