From a29d7441b0df06f34fce33089f8cd862ed494440 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: rabbitstack Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 23:50:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] feat(rules): Potential privilege elevation via arbitrary section creation Identifies potential privilege escalation attempts where a non-SYSTEM process creates symbolic links targeting object manager namespaces specific to memory section objects followed by the creation of a SYSTEM process. This behavior may indicate exploitation of arbitrary object directory or section creation vulnerabilities that abuse symbolic link redirection to manipulate privileged operations and gain elevated execution. --- ...evation_via_arbitrary_section_creation.yml | 46 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+) create mode 100644 rules/privilege_escalation_potential_privilege_elevation_via_arbitrary_section_creation.yml diff --git a/rules/privilege_escalation_potential_privilege_elevation_via_arbitrary_section_creation.yml b/rules/privilege_escalation_potential_privilege_elevation_via_arbitrary_section_creation.yml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..18c05e6cd --- /dev/null +++ b/rules/privilege_escalation_potential_privilege_elevation_via_arbitrary_section_creation.yml @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +name: Potential privilege elevation via arbitrary section creation +id: a232b3e4-17ac-4b0c-bcd3-43816b92d15d +version: 1.0.0 +description: | + Identifies potential privilege escalation attempts where a non-SYSTEM process creates + symbolic links targeting object manager namespaces specific to memory section objects + followed by the creation of a SYSTEM process. This behavior may indicate exploitation + of arbitrary object directory or section creation vulnerabilities that abuse symbolic + link redirection to manipulate privileged operations and gain elevated execution. +labels: + tactic.id: TA0004 + tactic.name: Privilege Escalation + tactic.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/ + technique.id: T1068 + technique.name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation + technique.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/ +references: + - https://www.threatlocker.com/blog/what-yellowkey-and-greenplasma-zero-day-exploits-reveal-about-trusting-native-windows-security + - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-createsymboliclinka + +condition: > + sequence + maxspan 1m + |create_symbolic_link_object and + evt.pid != 4 and ps.token.integrity_level not in ('HIGH', 'SYSTEM') and + evt.arg[source] imatches + ( + '\\Sessions\\*\\BaseNamedObjects\\*', + '\\BaseNamedObjects\\*', + '\\KnownDlls\\*', + '\\KnownDlls32\\*', + '\\Device\\*' + ) + | + |spawn_process and + ps.token.integrity_level = 'SYSTEM' and + ps.parent.exe not imatches + ( + '?:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe', + '?:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe' + ) + | + +severity: high + +min-engine-version: 3.0.0