diff --git a/.wolfssl_known_macro_extras b/.wolfssl_known_macro_extras
index 583422bea4..5e30c64b3b 100644
--- a/.wolfssl_known_macro_extras
+++ b/.wolfssl_known_macro_extras
@@ -651,6 +651,7 @@ WC_ASYNC_NO_SHA384
 WC_ASYNC_NO_SHA512
 WC_ASYNC_NO_X25519
 WC_ASYNC_THREAD_BIND
+WC_BLINDING_NO_RNG_ACKNOWLEDGE_WEAKNESS
 WC_CACHE_RESISTANT_BASE64_TABLE
 WC_DILITHIUM_FIXED_ARRAY
 WC_DISABLE_RADIX_ZERO_PAD
diff --git a/doc/dox_comments/header_files/cmac.h b/doc/dox_comments/header_files/cmac.h
index 4de7810a8a..b2bac936a4 100644
--- a/doc/dox_comments/header_files/cmac.h
+++ b/doc/dox_comments/header_files/cmac.h
@@ -174,8 +174,11 @@ int wc_AesCmacGenerate(byte* out, word32* outSz,
     \ingroup CMAC
     \brief Single shot function for validating a CMAC
     \return 0 on success
-    \param check CMAC value to verify
-    \param checkSz size of check buffer
+    \return BAD_FUNC_ARG if parameters are invalid
+    \return MAC_CMP_FAILED_E if the supplied tag does not match
+    \param check Expected MAC value to verify
+    \param checkSz size of expected MAC value; must be in
+    [\c WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ, \c WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]
     \param in input data to process
     \param inSz size of input data
     \param key key pointer
@@ -211,10 +214,8 @@ int wc_CMAC_Grow(Cmac* cmac, const byte* in, int inSz);
     \ingroup CMAC
     \brief Single shot AES-CMAC generation with extended parameters
     including heap and device ID.
-
     \return 0 on success
     \return BAD_FUNC_ARG if parameters are invalid
-
     \param cmac Pointer to Cmac structure (can be NULL for one-shot)
     \param out Buffer to store MAC output
     \param outSz Pointer to output size (in/out)
@@ -249,14 +250,13 @@ int wc_AesCmacGenerate_ex(Cmac *cmac, byte* out, word32* outSz,
     \ingroup CMAC
     \brief Single shot AES-CMAC verification with extended parameters
     including heap and device ID.
-
     \return 0 on success
     \return BAD_FUNC_ARG if parameters are invalid
     \return MAC_CMP_FAILED_E if MAC verification fails
-
-    \param cmac Pointer to Cmac structure (can be NULL for one-shot)
+    \param cmac Pointer to Cmac structure
     \param check Expected MAC value to verify
-    \param checkSz Size of expected MAC
+    \param checkSz Size of expected MAC; must be in
+    [\c WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ, \c WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]
     \param in Input data to authenticate
     \param inSz Length of input data
     \param key AES key
@@ -267,17 +267,24 @@ int wc_AesCmacGenerate_ex(Cmac *cmac, byte* out, word32* outSz,
 
     _Example_
     \code
-    byte mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    Cmac cmac;
+    byte mac[WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
     byte key[16], msg[64];
+    int ret;
 
-    int ret = wc_AesCmacVerify_ex(NULL, mac, sizeof(mac), msg,
+    ret = wc_InitCmac_ex(&cmac, key, sizeof(key), WC_CMAC_AES, NULL,
+                         NULL, INVALID_DEVID);
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        ret = wc_AesCmacVerify_ex(&cmac, mac, sizeof(mac), msg,
                                   sizeof(msg), key, sizeof(key),
                                   NULL, INVALID_DEVID);
+    }
     if (ret == MAC_CMP_FAILED_E) {
         // MAC verification failed
     }
     \endcode
 
+    \sa wc_InitCmac_ex
     \sa wc_AesCmacVerify
     \sa wc_AesCmacGenerate_ex
 */
diff --git a/src/tls13.c b/src/tls13.c
index 794e3e068d..e2d69c9f60 100644
--- a/src/tls13.c
+++ b/src/tls13.c
@@ -6139,7 +6139,10 @@ static int DoTls13CertificateRequest(WOLFSSL* ssl, const byte* input,
         ssl->options.sendVerify = SEND_BLANK_CERT;
 #else
         WOLFSSL_MSG("Certificate required but none set on client");
-        SendAlert(ssl, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        /* RFC 8446 Section 4.4.2.4: send certificate_required when a
+         * peer (here, the client) cannot provide a certificate that the
+         * other peer required. */
+        SendAlert(ssl, alert_fatal, certificate_required);
         WOLFSSL_ERROR_VERBOSE(NO_CERT_ERROR);
         return NO_CERT_ERROR;
 #endif
diff --git a/tests/api/test_cmac.c b/tests/api/test_cmac.c
index e30eeefb2e..b3af844e97 100644
--- a/tests/api/test_cmac.c
+++ b/tests/api/test_cmac.c
@@ -244,6 +244,47 @@ int test_wc_AesCmacGenerate(void)
         WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
     ExpectIntEQ(wc_AesCmacVerify(mac, macSz, NULL, msgSz, key, keySz),
         WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
+
+    ExpectIntEQ(wc_AesCmacVerify(mac, 1, msg, msgSz, key, keySz),
+        WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
+    ExpectIntEQ(wc_AesCmacVerify(mac, WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ - 1, msg, msgSz,
+        key, keySz), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
+    ExpectIntEQ(wc_AesCmacVerify(mac, WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 1, msg, msgSz,
+        key, keySz), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
+
+    /* Truncated tags within the supported range must verify correctly when
+     * the generator was asked to produce the same length */
+    {
+        byte truncMac[WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+        word32 truncSz;
+        word32 lengths[] = { WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ, 8, WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1 };
+        word32 lengthsSz = (word32)(sizeof(lengths)/sizeof(lengths[0]));
+        word32 li;
+        for (li = 0; li < lengthsSz; li++) {
+            XMEMSET(truncMac, 0, sizeof(truncMac));
+            truncSz = lengths[li];
+            ExpectIntEQ(wc_AesCmacGenerate(truncMac, &truncSz, msg, msgSz,
+                key, keySz), 0);
+            ExpectIntEQ(truncSz, lengths[li]);
+            ExpectIntEQ(wc_AesCmacVerify(truncMac, truncSz, msg, msgSz,
+                key, keySz), 0);
+            /* Flipping a bit in the truncated tag must yield
+             * MAC_CMP_FAILED_E, not silent success from comparing a too
+             * short prefix. */
+            truncMac[0] ^= 0x01;
+            ExpectIntEQ(wc_AesCmacVerify(truncMac, truncSz, msg, msgSz,
+                key, keySz), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(MAC_CMP_FAILED_E));
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* A full-length tag that does not match must return MAC_CMP_FAILED_E. */
+    {
+        byte badMac[WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+        XMEMCPY(badMac, mac, WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        badMac[0] ^= 0x01;
+        ExpectIntEQ(wc_AesCmacVerify(badMac, WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, msg, msgSz,
+            key, keySz), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(MAC_CMP_FAILED_E));
+    }
 #endif
     return EXPECT_RESULT();
 
diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/cmac.c b/wolfcrypt/src/cmac.c
index b5e23f85b1..0e8a9f7e42 100644
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/cmac.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/cmac.c
@@ -574,24 +574,32 @@ int wc_AesCmacVerify_ex(Cmac* cmac,
 {
     int ret = 0;
     byte a[WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    word32 aSz = sizeof(a);
+    word32 aSz;
     int compareRet;
 
-    if (cmac == NULL || check == NULL || checkSz == 0 ||
-            (in == NULL && inSz != 0)) {
+    if (cmac == NULL || check == NULL || checkSz < WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ ||
+            checkSz > WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE || (in == NULL && inSz != 0)) {
         return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
     }
 
-    XMEMSET(a, 0, aSz);
+    aSz = checkSz;
+    XMEMSET(a, 0, sizeof(a));
     ret = wc_AesCmacGenerate_ex(cmac,
                                 a, &aSz,
                                 in, inSz,
                                 key, keySz,
                                 heap,
                                 devId);
+    /* aSz is passed by reference to wc_AesCmacGenerate_ex, which on the
+     * WOLF_CRYPTO_CB path forwards it to a user-supplied callback that may
+     * write back any value. Reject anything that does not match the user
+     * provided length. */
+    if (ret == 0 && aSz != checkSz) {
+        ret = BAD_STATE_E;
+    }
     if (ret == 0) {
-        compareRet = ConstantCompare(check, a, (int)min(checkSz, aSz));
-        ret = compareRet ? 1 : 0;
+        compareRet = ConstantCompare(check, a, (int)aSz);
+        ret = compareRet ? MAC_CMP_FAILED_E : 0;
     }
 
     return ret;
@@ -605,7 +613,8 @@ int wc_AesCmacVerify(const byte* check, word32 checkSz,
     int ret = 0;
     WC_DECLARE_VAR(cmac, Cmac, 1, 0);
 
-    if (check == NULL || checkSz == 0 || (in == NULL && inSz > 0) ||
+    if (check == NULL || checkSz < WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ ||
+            checkSz > WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE || (in == NULL && inSz > 0) ||
             key == NULL || keySz == 0) {
         return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
     }
diff --git a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
index 12f25cc534..77d2caa1f7 100644
--- a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
+++ b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
@@ -4202,7 +4202,8 @@ extern void uITRON4_free(void *p) ;
 #if defined(HAVE_CURVE25519) && !defined(CURVE25519_SMALL) && \
     !defined(FREESCALE_LTC_ECC) && !defined(WOLFSSL_ARMASM) && \
     (!defined(USE_INTEL_SPEEDUP) || defined(NO_CURVED25519_X64)) && \
-    !defined(WOLFSSL_CURVE25519_BLINDING) && !defined(NO_CURVE25519_BLINDING)
+    !defined(WOLFSSL_CURVE25519_BLINDING) && !defined(NO_CURVE25519_BLINDING) \
+    && !defined(WC_NO_RNG)
     #define WOLFSSL_CURVE25519_BLINDING
 #endif
 
@@ -4212,7 +4213,8 @@ extern void uITRON4_free(void *p) ;
     #if (defined(USE_FAST_MATH) && !defined(TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT)) || \
         (defined(HAVE_ECC) && !defined(ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT)) || \
         (!defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(WC_RSA_BLINDING) && !defined(HAVE_FIPS) && \
-            !defined(WC_NO_RNG))
+            !defined(WC_NO_RNG) && !defined(WOLFSSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ONLY) && \
+            !defined(WOLFSSL_RSA_VERIFY_ONLY))
 
         #if !defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__TASKING__)
             #warning "For timing resistance / side-channel attack prevention consider using harden options"
@@ -4222,6 +4224,20 @@ extern void uITRON4_free(void *p) ;
     #endif
 #endif
 
+/* WC_NO_RNG silently removes RSA blinding, as blinding depends on the RNG.
+ * Refuse to build until the conflict is resolved or the loss of hardening is
+ * explicitly acknowledged via WC_BLINDING_NO_RNG_ACKNOWLEDGE_WEAKNESS. */
+#if defined(WC_NO_RNG) && ((defined(WC_RSA_BLINDING) && !defined(NO_RSA) && \
+    !defined(WOLFSSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ONLY) && !defined(WOLFSSL_RSA_VERIFY_ONLY)) || \
+    (defined(HAVE_CURVE25519) && defined(WOLFSSL_CURVE25519_BLINDING)) || \
+    (defined(HAVE_ECC) && defined(WOLFSSL_ECC_BLIND_K))) && \
+    !defined(WC_BLINDING_NO_RNG_ACKNOWLEDGE_WEAKNESS)
+    #error "Blinding is enabled but the RNG is disabled.  Either remove \
+WC_NO_RNG to enable the RNG, disable blinding by removing WC_RSA_BLINDING/\
+WOLFSSL_CURVE25519_BLINDING/WOLFSSL_ECC_BLIND_K, or acknowledge the loss of \
+blinding by defining WC_BLINDING_NO_RNG_ACKNOWLEDGE_WEAKNESS."
+#endif
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_COEXIST
     /* make sure old names are disabled */
     #ifndef NO_OLD_SSL_NAMES