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fix(vc): bind credential verification to the signed proof (#105, #108) #110
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| Bind credential verification to the signed proof. `verifyProof()` now returns the credential decoded from `proof.jwt`, and `verifyParsedCredential()` runs every downstream check (expiry, revocation, trusted issuer, and claim verifiers) against that verified credential rather than the caller-supplied object. It also now returns the verified credential, so consumers can read signed fields from the return value instead of the object they passed in. On the parsed-credential input path a caller could previously attach a valid `proof.jwt` while mutating the outer `credentialSubject`, `issuer`, etc.; those fields were trusted directly. Now they are ignored in favor of the signed payload. Fixes #105 and #108. |
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Because this now only returns the credential decoded from
proof.jwtand leaves the caller-supplied object unchanged, internal call sites that ignore the return value can still consume unsigned outer fields. For example,verifyPaymentReceiptcallsverifyParsedCredential(...)and then readsparsedCredential.credentialSubject.paymentRequestTokenatpackages/ack-pay/src/verify-payment-receipt.ts:82-90; with parsed-object input, a caller can keep a valid signed receipt proof while swapping the outerpaymentRequestToken, so the signed subject is verified but the swapped token is the one returned/verified. Please update those consumers to use this returned credential, or otherwise replace/mutate the input before returning from verification.Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.