π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Path Traversal in File Download API#17
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Path Traversal in File Download API#17thirdeyenation wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
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Co-authored-by: thirdeyenation <133812267+thirdeyenation@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: The
DownloadFileendpoint inapi/download_work_dir_file.pyusedfile_info.get_file_infowithout properly validating the user-provided path parameter against the application's base directory limits.π― Impact: An attacker could use
../directory traversal payloads to download any readable file from the host operating system outside of the intended workspace directory (e.g., system configuration files or secrets).π§ Fix: Added a definitive security boundary check using
helpers.files.is_in_base_dir()after resolving the absolute path in theDownloadFileendpoint. If the resolved path escapes the base directory bounds, the API safely rejects the request with a ValueError.β Verification: Verified by running unit tests. The fix prevents directory traversal payloads like
../../../etc/passwdfrom successfully returning file contents. Recorded the learning in.jules/sentinel.md.PR created automatically by Jules for task 17354534009067564141 started by @thirdeyenation